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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
ow that the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) has come into operation and the 
first round of allocation has been completed, discussions have begun on how to adapt 
and amend the scheme in light of these initial experiences. The first phase (2005-07) 
currently underway was intended to be a pilot phase allowing for ‘learning by doing’.  
Adaptation and review will be undertaken in two steps. In the first step, changes can be 
introduced in the short-term implementation phase, especially to national allocation, based on 
the experiences of the first round of allocation. In the second step, as mandated by the Directive, 
a formal strategic review will be conducted by the European Commission, to begin no later than 
the end of June 2006. 
This CEPS Task Force has addressed the first step, i.e. issues related to short-term 
implementation in two separate reports. This present report (Part I) focuses on harmonisation 
requirements (including resolving the Annex I definition of installation), consistency of 
allocation methodologies across member states, transparency of national allocation plans 
(NAPs), unilateral opt-ins for other gases and activities, and monitoring, reporting and 
verification requirements. A Part II report, to be published in the autumn 2005, will examine 
more fundamental topics, such as economic impacts, power market structure, effects on 
investment and the potential inclusion of aviation,, which lie at the interface with the formal 
strategic review (as is indicated in section 1.3.) 
After taking stock of the EU ETS, the report examines the need and potential for short-term 
improvement and makes concrete, operational recommendations to the EU member states and 
the European Commission.  
The report does not provide a detailed analysis but rather a description (in section 3) of market-
development issues, such as registry management; legal, taxation and accounting issues; the 
scheme’s relationship with the relevant financial services regulation; and potential constraints 
due to the Commitment Period Reserve. 
Looking ahead, this CEPS Task Force will not deal with the formal strategic review in 2006, i.e. 
the second step of the EU ETS review. This analysis will be undertaken by a separate CEPS 
Task Force to be launched in the end of 2005. Its report will deal, inter alia, with allocation 
methodologies for the third phase, the expansion of the scheme to new sectors and gases, the 
possibility to link with non-EU trading schemes, the relationship with the renewables Directive 
and also possible negative economic impacts including investment disincentives.) 
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I. Key  Messages 
1.  The overall objective of the EU climate change policy is to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in general and to meet the Kyoto Protocol targets in particular. Since the EU ETS 
is the principal instrument with which the EU and member states intend to achieve these 
objectives, it will ultimately be judged on the basis of its effectiveness. Even though most 
member states are already off-target with respect to their emissions obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol, the overwhelming majority of member states have nevertheless allowed for 
an increase of emissions from the trading sectors during the learning period of 2005-07. The 
long-term success of the EU ETS, however, will depend on whether it can ensure emissions 
reductions in line with EU and member state climate targets, in combination with other 
measures aimed at reducing emissions from all other sectors.  
2.  The EU ETS has also been chosen as the key instrument to reduce emissions as it has the 
potential to meet the environmental goal in the most cost-effective way. Yet whether this 
potential of least-cost abatement materialises depends on both the design of the scheme and 
the implementation practice. While fundamental design issues will require changes in the 
Directive, there are possibilities to introduce improvements in the second round of 
allocation. There is no reason why the EU and member states should not be able to take into 
account the experiences from the first phase of allocation to improve the second phase. 
Further, many changes can be implemented by coordination or by the Climate Change 
Committee, or by political agreement without the necessity of changing the Directive. 
3.  Success of the EU ETS depends, inter alia, on simplicity. While all stakeholders agree in 
principle to strive towards a simple and consistent scheme, there was pressure on 
governments to grant exemptions and special treatment in national allocations, which tends 
to increase complexity. An overly complex EU ETS will jeopardise attainment of both 
environmental and economic objectives, which, namely, are to reach the necessary 
reductions at the least cost.  
4.  There are several areas in which the ETS could be improved for the second phase of 
allocation. Among the most immediate areas are NAP-related harmonisation requirements, 
such as the definition of combustion installations, treatment of small installations, new 
entrants, closure and transfer rules. Other important areas include rules on allocation 
methodologies and, more generally, the transparency of NAPs, as well as monitoring, 
reporting and verification.  
5.  The Directive requires paying attention to issues of competitiveness. Since the 
competitiveness effects of the EU ETS are critical for the future development, it is 
important that this issue is constructively settled. Given the major differences between 
member states (e.g. location of competitors in the Mediterranean or effects of power 
markets), more information on national or regional effects may be needed to complement 
the European Commission’s study on EU-wide impacts. It is important to consider realistic 
alternative policy instruments that could be applied rather than compare no regulation with 
participation in the EU ETS.  
6.  It is essential to address the investment conundrum in imaginative and practical ways. Some 
promising ideas include the use of long-term energy efficiency targets as an instrument to 
establish a long-term cap for the manufacturing industry or indicative long-term targets for 
the power sector or accepting a ceiling for the allowance price to provide better long-term 
certainty. 
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II. Recommendations   
Applying the lessons learned  
1.  Since the first period (2005-07) has explicitly been designed as a pilot phase, there must be 
an opportunity to apply lessons learned from the first phase of allocation to the second 
phase. The aim should be to consolidate and simplify implementation of the EU ETS, whilst 
also incorporating the lessons ‘learnt by doing’. 
2.  The various legislative, regulatory/administrative or political options that are available 
within the existing legal framework should be exploited in order to adapt the EU ETS for 
the second phase of national allocation with a view to redressing the shortcomings that have 
been identified.  
3.  Should the European Commission and member states want to consider delaying the NAP 
timetable for a limited period, as some stakeholders have suggested, this should only be 
done on the condition that adequate time is guaranteed to allow for access to information 
and public consultation (see recommendations 16 and 17) as well as Commission scrutiny.  
4.  Adaptation of the EU ETS should aim at increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
market, inter alia, by providing simplicity, transparency and long-term abatement incentives 
to achieve EU and member state climate change and other policy objectives whilst ensuring 
the competitiveness of European business.  
NAP harmonisation requirements 
5.  The definition of combustion installations must be harmonised for the second phase as 
analysed in the main report.  
6.  Member states and the European Commission should address the issue of disproportionate 
burdens on small installations, provided that installations are subject to emissions limits.  
7.  At a minimum, a first step towards the harmonisation of methodologies on new entrants, 
closures and transfers as well as treatment of new entrants’ reserves should be taken as long 
as this harmonisation is compatible with national energy policy (as analysed in the main 
body of the text) to avoid ‘gaming’ and to prohibit a race to the bottom, and, ultimately, to 
maintain trust in the scheme.  
It is noted that the absence of special closure rules – i.e. in case of closure, installations can 
keep their allowances until the end of the allocation period – could, in principle, and should 
encourage investment in cleaner technology, provided there is consistency of new entrant 
rules across member states and no additional transfer rules. 
Allocation methodologies 
8.  Member states should strive to increase consistency of allocation methodologies to ensure 
that similar installations receive comparable allocation. Differences in the overall 
constraints in member states as a result of the Burden-Sharing Agreement could be 
smoothed over by the assignment of credits from the project mechanisms. 
9.  Both benchmarking (or performance-based allocation) and auctioning offer the potential to 
improve the consistency of national approaches. Member states should continue to further 
study both of these methodologies.  
10. Should it prove difficult to obtain an overall agreement on benchmarks, member states 
could start developing them for certain dedicated sectors. Particular attention should be paid 4 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA  
 
to the advantages of benchmarks as a way to harmonise rules for new entrants, closures and 
transfers. 
11. Most importantly, member states together with the European Commission could explore the 
possibility to use benchmarks as a tool for establishing a long-term cap, or comparing 
allocations between member states.  
12. Member states that have chosen to auction a part of their allowances must ensure that 
auctioning is practical and consistent with the spirit and the letter of the internal market, 
especially the eligibility criteria for participation, timing and if it applies, the rules for 
revenue recycling. However, it should not be allowed that auctioning shifts the problem of 
allocation to recycling. 
13. The European Commission should provide guidance on how member states should conduct 
auctions, and whether these may be closed or must be open at EU level. 
NAPs 
14. The European Commission and member states need to ensure access to information on the 
NAPs in an inclusive and non-discriminatory way to all stakeholders, to ensure 
transparency, accuracy and greater consistency of NAPs.  
15. The European Commission and member states must also guarantee that the time frame for 
access to information and public consultation is adhered to. This is a precondition for 
transparency and accuracy.  
16. Member states and the European Commission should agree on a common format of NAPs. 
This must contain an executive summary presenting key figures, including: 
a)  assumptions of economic and sector-specific economic growth; 
b)  explanation of methodologies to establish the total number of allowances;  
c)  Kyoto Protocol targets and the trajectory to get there; 
d)  more details on which member states can base their estimates to purchase proposed 
CDM/JI credits, including the expected share stemming from the linking Directive; and 
e)  publication of data on which allocation is based, including historical emissions and 
output or input data to facilitate analysis and comparability of NAPs. 
17. The European Commission should provide guidance on an updated common format of 
NAPs. 
Monitoring, reporting and verification 
18.  The European Commission needs to enforce uniform implementation of EU rules on 
monitoring, reporting and verification to nurture trust throughout the EU in the ETS.  
19.  The European Commission and member states should examine the possibility for further 
harmonisation of monitoring, reporting and verification with the ultimate goal to move to 
a single system, which would not only bring down transaction costs but also improve 
mutual trust.  
20.  Efficiency gains are especially possible in the area of verification. Accordingly, the 
European Commission and the member states should first explore whether to harmonise 
rules on verification.  PRIORITIES FOR EU ETS REVIEW | 5 
 
21.  Second, the European Commission and the member states should investigate whether to 
establish a common accreditation body that would be responsible for accreditation of 
verifiers on an EU-wide basis.  
22.  If harmonisation of rules at the EU level for both verification and accreditation of 
verifiers is not possible, at a minimum the accreditation bodies in all EU member states 
should follow similar rules for accreditation, which should ultimately allow for ‘mutual 
recognition’ of accredited bodies from one EU member state to another. 
Market development and certainty  
23.  Given the importance of certainty and clarity on legal, tax, accounting and financial 
regulation issues to the market, efforts to clarify any issue that is unresolved in one or all 
member states must be increased.  
a)  The VAT committee should maintain a harmonised approach throughout the EU. 
b)  The work by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)/International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to address inconsistencies in accounting 
between assets (allowances) and liabilities is welcomed while speedy resolution is 
needed.  
c)  Member states and the European Commission should act urgently to achieve clarity 
regarding the treatment of contracts under the markets in financial services Directive 
(MiFID) to avoid the risk that contracts are voided and participants are subject to 
penalties.  
d)  Registry managers in the member states should share information and best practices.  
e)  Member states should reinforce efforts that have already been taken to seek more 
cooperation in the further development of registries, particularly electronic interfaces. 
24.  Rules should be devised to avoid a breach of the Commitment Period Reserve clause under 
the Marrakech Accords to ensure that national registries are not blocked. 
Expansion to other gases (unilateral opt-ins) 
25. The inclusion of new gases could offer major environmental and economic benefits (i.e. 
coverage of more sources, potentially lower compliance costs if marginal costs in the 
trading sector are higher than in the installations to be opted-in). Therefore, member states 
should examine the possibility of unilateral opt-ins.  
26. To avoid distortions within the internal market, unilateral opt-ins should be made in a 
coordinated and harmonised way and in parallel by virtually all member states where 
emissions occur, provided that the opt-ins are unanimously supported by the concerned 
industry. 
27. Furthermore, unilateral opt-ins must fulfil a number of conditions, including: 
a)  Monitoring and reporting must be ensured. 
b)  The complexity of the EU ETS must not increase disproportionately. 
c)  Previous reductions made for economic or legal reasons must not result in over-
generous allocation. 
d)  Double-counting must be avoided. 
e)  Lead times of abatement possibilities must be respected. 6 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA  
 
28. Most importantly, definitions and thresholds must be harmonised to avoid inconsistent 
definitions and placing undue burdens on small installations. 
29. Further expansion of the system on a step-by-step basis is desirable, such that the key 
underlying premise of emissions trading to seek out the most cost-effective abatement 
opportunities in the economy is maintained. Therefore, the European Commission and 
member states should examine the opt-in of N20 emissions from nitric acid plants, which 
seem to offer clearly defined and cost-effective reduction potentials and whose inclusion 
has been strongly endorsed by the EU industry. | 7 
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Introduction 
The EU emissions trading scheme (ETS)
1  is the cornerstone of EU climate change policy. 
Covering some 45% of total EU CO2 emissions, it is the showcase of the EU’s seriousness about 
climate change. Since the EU ETS accepts credits from the Kyoto Protocol’s project 
mechanisms, it also has global reach. It offers the EU a platform from which to shape or at least 
to influence an eventual global trading scheme. For such a scheme to materialise, however, it is 
essential that the EU ETS can demonstrate that it is environmentally effective, economically 
efficient and politically acceptable. Proving the latter will to a large extent depend on the 
scheme’s actual and perceived distribution effects.  
The EU ETS was the first cross-border tradable permit scheme (or emissions trading as it is 
generally referred to in the EU) of this kind. Hence, ‘teething problems’ should be and have 
been expected. This was why the first phase (2005-07) was generally perceived as a pilot phase 
allowing for an element of ‘learning by doing’. It was commonly accepted that a certain amount 
of adaptation would be necessary.  
Reviewing the EU ETS will take place in two steps. First, there will be a number of valuable 
experiences from the first round of National Allocation Plans (NAPs phase I), which will inform 
the process of the second round of allocation (NAPs phase II). These lessons will be called 
priorities for short-term implementation. Adaptation will be possible, largely within the existing 
legal framework as the available time for major changes in the Directive through co-decision is 
most likely to be too short. Nevertheless, changes within the existing framework are possible if 
sufficient political will exists. Possible changes will be analysed in this Part I report and the 
follow-up Part II study to be published in the autumn 2005.  
This report as well as the follow-up study Part II will not examine issues related to the formal 
review of the EU ETS that the Directive foresees to take place no later than June 2006. As this 
formal review, which will lead to an amendment of the Directive by co-decision, is likely to 
trigger a fundamental and longer term debate, issues related to it will be treated in a separate 
Task Force that CEPS plans to launch in late 2005. The Directive lists 11 items for review, 
including inter alia expansion to new sectors (e.g. other industrial installations and transport 
including aviation); inclusion of non-CO2 greenhouse gases (GHGs) covered by the Kyoto 
Protocol; competitiveness and distributional effects; future (i.e. post-2012) allocation 
methodologies, including the possibility of using benchmarks; consistency with environmental 
and other policies; monitoring, verification and registry issues, especially whether there should 
                                                 
1 Directive 2003/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading within the Community and amending Council 
Directive 96/61/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, 25 October 2003. 8 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA  
 
be a single Community registry; and the relationship with International Emissions Trading 
(IET).  (delete: We will call this the formal 2006 Review. ) 
This CEPS Task Force Report Part I focuses on a number of short-term implementation issues. 
(delete: principally related to the second round of allocation). They include NAP transparency 
requirements, the definition of installations, treatment of small installations, new entrants, 
closure and transfer rules, allocation methodologies, the possibility of opt-ins as well as 
monitoring, reporting and verification. It will examine the need and potential for adaptation of 
the EU ETS and its implementation practice. Our findings will be presented to EU member 
states, including the UK EU Presidency, and the European Commission.  
After taking stock of the EU ETS in section 1 and focusing on market developments and 
certainty in section 2, sections 3 and 4 respectively provide the principal analysis on NAP 
harmonisation requirements and monitoring, reporting and verification. Concluding remarks are 
offered in the final section.  
The main findings of the report are contained in the Executive Summary, including Key 
Messages and Recommendations.  
The report has three Appendices. Appendix 1 reproduces Annex III of the EU ETS Directive 
(Criteria for national allocation plans) while Appendix 2 contains Annex IV of the EU ETS 
Directive (Criteria for verification). Appendix 3 presents a list of members of the Task Force 
and invited guests and speakers. 
A follow-up Part II report to be published in the autumn 2005 will examine deep-seated topics 
such economic impacts, power market structure, effects on investment, the potential inclusion of 
aviation or the relationship to the renewables Directive, which lie at the interface of NAP phase 
II and the long-term formal 2006 review.    
1.  The EU Emissions Trading Scheme after six months  
From the very beginning, the EU emissions trading scheme attracted considerable attention and 
was subjected to intensive analysis both within and outside the EU. Therefore, although it has 
been in operation for only six months and not all support structures are yet in place, there is 
nevertheless sufficient experience upon which to base an informed discussion on a possible 
review. This is especially true for allocation, as the first round of NAPs is almost completed.  
1.1  Why emissions trading was chosen  
Emissions trading in general and the EU ETS in particular were chosen as they promised to 
meet the environmental goal in the most cost-effective way by ensuring that the market price of 
carbon is equal to the lowest marginal abatement cost of all controlled sources. Therefore, the 
EU ETS should help to foster economic growth and employment. The resulting carbon price 
should create long-term predictability for business, a crucial factor in efficient investment 
decisions. In addition, it provides for a mechanism by which emitters – factory operators, oil 
refineries, etc. – can identify the most cost-effective way to reduce their emissions and thus 
factor carbon-reduction strategies into day-to-day business decisions. Emissions trading can go 
beyond existing environmental policy – mainly seen as an inescapable overhead – by 
establishing a long-term and predictable price signal upon which firms base investment 
decisions while still retaining significant flexibility to achieve the environmental objective. At 
the same time, emissions trading aims to provide environmental certainty by capping the overall PRIORITIES FOR EU ETS REVIEW | 9 
 
emissions level from the covered sources.
2  Combined with a robust compliance system 
(including for example credible penalties and an effective enforcement mechanism), emissions 
trading ensures that targets are met. It also lends itself well to dealing with the implementation 
of the Kyoto Protocol targets, as they are also expressed in absolute terms. As is the case with 
any change in the regulatory framework, the EU ETS has distributional impacts, i.e. it has 
created winners and losers.  
Theoretical economic and environmental advantages of least-cost abatement depend to a 
considerable degree, however, on the market architecture, comprising design (e.g. directives) 
and implementation practice (e.g. NAPs). Ultimately, both efficiency and effectiveness of the 
EU ETS will depend on the interaction of allocation, the functioning of the secondary allowance 
and the primary power (or other affected product) markets.  
The EU and member states operate within a triangle of environmental effectiveness, efficiency 
(including simplicity) and distributive impacts. While efficiency and environmental 
effectiveness by and large are compatible and even are mutually dependent, it is mainly 
attempts to address distributive effects that have proven to undermine the efficiency, notably by 
adding complexity or by changing the incentive structure. There is compelling and well-
documented evidence that the original US trading schemes from the 1970s failed because they 
suffered from over-complexity, which undermined economic efficiency and eroded incentives. 
These early emissions trading schemes were subsequently abandoned for what became the SO2 
emissions trading scheme.
3 
Generally, it can be said that member states, in balancing the triangle of objectives, tend to 
emphasise the distributive impacts (sometimes referred to as ‘fairness’) over effectiveness and 
efficiency/simplicity. This emphasis, however, tends to add complexity to the scheme. Member 
states seem also to have forgotten that market efficiency in most cases does not contradict 
environmental effectiveness.  
1.2  Short-term implementation for the second round of allocation  
Now that the first round of allocation is almost completed, a number of concerns have been 
identified. An important concern is that of environmental targets, because most member states 
have allowed emissions from the covered sectors to rise in the period 2005-07, despite the fact 
that many must reduce their emissions to achieve their Kyoto Protocol targets. For example 
several member states have allowed their covered sectors to increase emissions by as much as 
10 or 20%, although they are on a trajectory that will them not enable to meet the Kyoto 
Protocol targets. Other concerns relate to the high degree of decentralisation with a considerable 
level of member state discretion in the allocation process (i.e. NAP-related issues). This has led 
to inconsistencies between member states, which could distort competition, diminish the 
efficiency of the market and ultimately, undermine environmental effectiveness and the trust 
placed in the system.  
Issues related to national allocation include harmonisation requirements in a number of areas 
such as transparency needs, the definition of combustion installations, treatment of small 
installations, rules for new entrants, closures and transfers, allocation methodologies (notably 
their consistency) and opt-ins of other gases. There is a wide agreement in principle within the 
European Commission, member states, industry, NGOs or traders and stakeholders that 
harmonisation would be beneficial.  
                                                 
2 This ‘environmental certainty’ extends only to the covered sources. There is a risk of ‘leakage’ unless 
caps or similar measures are applied worldwide. 
3 See Klaassen (1996) and Godard (2000). For an overview, see Egenhofer (2003). 10 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA  
 
The petrochemical industry offers a good illustration of the consequences of a lack of 
harmonisation in which the inclusion of crackers in the EU ETS depends purely on the plant’s 
location. Only those member states with a broad definition have included them, whereas in 
others they are excluded. There are even different rules within member states (see section 3.2). 
Another example of potential inefficiency is the treatment of small installations, which in some 
cases have to bear disproportional transaction costs that by far outweigh the benefits. A similar 
situation can be found in the area of monitoring, reporting and verification where we can 
currently count more than 50 different systems in operation. Inconsistencies not only create 
distortions to competition but they are also responsible for unnecessary transaction costs that 
may undermine the system. 
Nevertheless, a look to the past suggests that achieving harmonisation may be very difficult. 
Member states have opted for a high degree of decentralisation to maintain considerable 
influence, notably over allocation, for reasons of competitiveness and distributive impacts, i.e. 
to ‘help’ their companies. Member states have been reluctant to impose stricter targets on ‘their’ 
industries than do other member states. This attitude has not changed.  
1.3  A reminder of some fundamentals  
It is necessary to address short-term implementation issues for effective implementation of the 
EU ETS including its economic efficiency and viability, but they are not sufficient on their own. 
In addition to the questions on the stringency of member state caps, the EU ETS has raised a 
number of more fundamental questions – including economic impact, the consequence of a lack 
of certainty and its effects on investment but also the Directive’s relationship with the 
renewables Directive. These issues lie at the interface of NAP phase II and the long-term formal 
2006 review. Hence, they will be analysed in a follow-up Part II report to be completed in 
September/October of this year together with other principal topics of this review, such as for 
example allocation methodologies for the third phase, the expansion of the scheme to new 
sectors and gases and the possibility to link with non-EU trading schemes. 
Economic impacts  
The level of anticipated power price increases and especially the extent to which the power 
generators will earn increased profits as a result of higher power prices without incurring 
additional costs, is likely to remain subject to debate (IEA, 2004 and Egenhofer et al., 2005). 
See also Box 1. 
It is generally agreed that the EU ETS will mainly affect the costs of energy-intensive industries 
indirectly through higher power prices. The actual impact on individual industries, however, 
remains controversial. There are two principal reasons for this disagreement: i) debate over the 
effects of the EU ETS on power prices, which are expected to vary in different markets 
(Egenhofer et al., 2005, pp. 17-21 and ILEX, 2004) and ii) differing abilities of sectors to pass 
through costs
4 in different product markets.
5 The one notable exception to the general finding is 
                                                 
4 The latter was the reason why energy-intensive industries in the UK challenged the Carbon Trust (2004) 
study. 
5 According to the theoretical and empirical literature, environmental policy is but one of many factors 
that firms take into account when making investment decisions. Empirical knowledge of country-specific 
relocation effects is very limited, especially in Europe. The existing empirical evidence of the interaction 
between environmental policy and the effects on competitiveness remains largely inconclusive (Scholz & 
Stähler, 1999 and Ederington et al., 2003). The idea that environmental policy undermines 
competitiveness is often based on a static view of competitiveness, in which technology is considered 
exogenous (i.e. decoupled from environmental regulation). PRIORITIES FOR EU ETS REVIEW | 11 
 
the aluminium industry, where studies (e.g. Carbon Trust, 2004 and IEA, 2004) concur that it is 
directly affected in its net value as a result of the fact that the sector cannot pass on price 
increases, as product prices are set by international commodity markets. The same may be true 
for certain product markets in other sectors, for example BOF (basic oxygen furnace) steel.  
In addition to issues of different sectors’ ‘ability to pass through costs’, another determinant of 
the competitiveness of EU industry is how quickly non-EU producers can increase their 
production in the short-term. It is, therefore likely, that negative effects on competitiveness do 
not fully come into play in the short-term. This is even more true if investors assume that over a 
reasonable period other countries will gradually become subject to carbon constraints. 
Since the competitiveness effect of the EU ETS is extremely critical for future development, it 
is important that this discussion continues and ultimately is satisfactorily settled. In light of the 
major differences between member states (e.g. location of competitors, such as in the 
Mediterranean, or the effects of power markets), it was suggested that member states or groups 
of member states or other stakeholders should undertake their own studies, concentrating on 
national or regional impacts. Such analysis should consider realistic alternative policy 
instruments that could be applied, rather than comparing no regulation with participation in the 
EU ETS. The European Commission should start to identify possibilities to address the topic in 
consultation with the covered industry and other stakeholders. 
 
Box 1. Conclusions from a previous CEPS Task Force (2005) 
The expected economic impact of the EU ETS has been subject to a great number of studies 
prior to the launch of the scheme. Available studies have been reviewed in the previous CEPS 
Task Force on Business Consequences of the EU ETS and summarised as follows: 
The EU ETS will have an impact on the competitiveness of energy-intensive industries such as cement, 
pulp and paper, glass, steel/metal, aluminium, chemicals and refining. This impact will occur 
regardless of whether or not the sectors are covered by the EU ETS. For those industries outside the 
scope of the ETS, the impact will come from higher power prices … . For those industries falling 
within the scheme’s scope, the impact will not only come from higher power prices but also increased 
costs from process emissions unless member states have given special treatment regarding process 
emissions. Consequently, some energy-intensive industries may suffer a competitive disadvantage 
owing to the fact that competitors of the EU industry may not be subject to the same constraints. For 
some industries, the competitive disadvantage is related to the geographical proximity of competitors 
(e.g. refining or cement production in the Mediterranean countries). For others it is related to the fact 
that cost increases cannot be passed on due to prices being set on the international commodities 
markets (e.g. parts of the energy intensive-industries, most notably aluminium). … The ultimate cause 
for the potential competitiveness problems is the fact that not all competitors of EU industry are 
subject to an equivalent carbon constraint. 
Source: Egenhofer et al. (2005). 
Power market structure  
There is also a fear that free allocation based on historical grandfathering might increase market 
power and that the resulting windfall effect will strengthen the market position of the 
incumbents to such a degree as to undermine competition and simultaneously inhibit new entry. 
Many of the EU’s power markets suffer from a high degree of concentration (Egenhofer & 
Gialoglou, 2004 and European Commission, 2004). Market power concentration may create 
some barriers to entry in the retail supply market. Ultimately, power markets would be less 
competitive and result in higher power prices. 12 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA  
 
Investment  
Investment (dis)incentives have been another concern of the analyses carried out on the EU 
ETS. In its initial stage, it is highly likely that the EU ETS will add to investment uncertainty in 
the covered sectors and as a result, new investment may be deferred.  
In response, there has been some discussion on how to create greater stability and predictability 
in the EU ETS, such as establishing longer-term allocation periods, aligning targets with the 
investment cycle by using for example long-term efficiency targets as an instrument to set a cap 
for the manufacturing industry, setting ceiling prices of allowance prices, or more generally by 
improving consistency between current and envisaged (short- and medium-term) policies and 
long-term objectives. This will be further discussed in the follow-up Part II CEPS report to be 
published in September/October 2005. 
Relationship to the renewables Directive  
The EU renewables Directive
6 aims at achieving 22% of electricity from renewable sources of 
energy in the EU by 2012. The overall EU target has been broken down into national targets, 
which are set out in the Annex of the Renewables Directive similar to those enumerated in the 
burden-sharing agreement. The renewables Directive mandates member states to support 
development of renewable sources by support mechanisms, which in most cases takes the form 
of financial support. The two instruments – the ETS and support for RES-E (renewable 
generated electricity) production – pursue different objectives. One aims to increase the share of 
renewables (i.e. supply) while the other seeks to reduce GHG emissions (i.e. supply and demand 
measures). Yet, a member state’s policy can have a major impact on the EU ETS and vice versa.  
1.4  How to adapt the ETS and when?  
After completion of all National Allocation Plans (NAPs), the European Commission has 
approved 6,572.4 billion metric tonnes of allowances (for the period 2005-07) from 11,428 
installations. The European Commission reduced allocations by over 290 Mt (millions of metric 
tonnes) and agreed that unused reserves would be cancelled (European Commission, 2005). In 
addition, the European Commission has rejected what it considers ex-post adjustments, which in 
its view would undermine the certainty of the total number of allowances (i.e. a cap) that is 
needed to make the system work. Allowing for ex-post adjustment would make governments 
vulnerable to pressure from companies to make further ‘adjustments’.  
In theory, there are four ways of adapting the EU ETS for the second round of allocation: 
1.  Amendment of the Directive
7  under Art. 30 through co-decision. As the co-decision 
procedure could take up to two years or more – the average time for a proposal to be 
adopted in co-decision is around 18 months, excluding conciliation – it will be next to 
impossible to amend the Directive until phase II of the NAPs, which is due to be completed 
by 30 June 2006. Should the political will exist, there is however a conceivable possibility 
to postpone the NAPs for a short period.  
                                                 
6 Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the 
Promotion of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources in the Internal Electricity Market, Official 
Journal L 283, 27 October 2001, p. 33. 
7 Directive 2003/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emissions allowance trading within the Community and amending Council 
Directive 96/61/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, 25 October 2003. PRIORITIES FOR EU ETS REVIEW | 13 
 
2.  Amendment of some of the Annex III criteria via so-called ‘Comitology Committee’ 
procedure. However, the European Parliament tends to be critical of this procedure as it can 
be seen as undermining the EP’s role in co-decision.  
3.  Via the European Commission’s updated Guidance Document
8 but this will be non-binding 
on member states. 
4.  Unilateral or joint actions by member states.  
In addition, the Directive foresees a formal review of the EU ETS (by no later than 30 June 
2006), which will amend the Directive by co-decision-making. The Directive lists 11 items for 
review, including inter alia expansion to new sectors (e.g. other industrial installations and 
transport, including aviation); inclusion of non-CO2 greenhouse gases (GHGs) covered by the 
Kyoto Protocol; competitiveness and distributional effects; future (i.e. post-2012) allocation 
methodologies, including the possibility of using benchmarks; consistency with environmental 
and other policies; monitoring, verification and registry issues, especially whether there should 
be a single Community registry; and the relationship with International Emissions Trading 
(IET). These will not be covered in this report. 
2.  Market development and certainty 
In addition to environmental effectiveness, market efficiency is a crucial criterion by which the 
success of the ETS will be judged. Only a market that functions properly will be able to achieve 
the promised efficiency gains. Market efficiency depends on the one hand on proper support 
structures and clarity and consistency of the rules that affect the operation of the scheme. 
Typically, this includes support structures such as registries; monitoring, reporting and 
verification (the latter of which is treated separately in section 4); and clarity and consistency 
with ETS objectives of economic regulation such as legal, tax, accounting or financial 
regulation and which are usually described as market development issues. In addition, the 
market and its efficiency are influenced by design and implementation of the scheme and the 
way it will be further developed. Design and implementation principally relate to allocation 
(including member states’ caps, expansion, CDM/JI credits or treatment of new entrants’ 
reserves) and future development of the EU ETS such as expansion, linking with other schemes 
or the relationship with international emissions trading. All these factors influence supply and 
demand and price, firm behaviour, the environmental outcome and investment.  
2.1  Market development issues  
A first set of issues resides largely outside the scope of the Directive and relates to uncertainties 
regarding legal, taxation or accounting issues and treatment under financial services legislation. 
Another category includes support systems, such as registries or monitoring, reporting and 
verification. Addressing all these topics will take time even if there is a consensus, as they raise 
many difficult technical issues. 
                                                 
8 Previous Guidance Document: European Commission (2003), Communication from the Commission on 
guidance to assist Member States in the implementation of the criteria listed in Annex III to Directive 
2003/87/EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community 
and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, and on the circumstances under which force majeure is 
demonstrated, Brussels, 7 January, 2004 COM (2003)830final. 14 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA  
 
Legal, tax, accounting and financial services regulation  
The EU ETS has posed a number of tax and legal uncertainties for companies with an 
international CO2 portfolio and that operate actively in the cross-border market. Some questions 
have been raised on the character of ownership of the allowances: e.g. whether the buyer of 
allowances has full or beneficial ownership and whether security lending is permitted. Another 
issue is pre-emption rights for tax agencies or other pre-emption rights in case of insolvency 
regarding the allowance property of an EU ETS participant. Pre-emption rights for tax agencies 
regarding the allowance property of a participant in emissions trading will increase the 
uncertainty in forward transactions and may conflict with insolvency regulations in individual 
member states. Uncertainty on the legal status of the allowances will also lead to uncertainty 
regarding liability and accounting. Therefore there is a need to clarify any issue that may remain 
outstanding in all or some member states. Of particular relevance is how to treat insolvent 
installations. 
It is encouraging that there has been major progress on VAT after the EU VAT Committee 
decided to endorse the harmonised interpretation of the VAT treatment on emissions trading 
(VAT levy in place of supply). It is hoped that the VAT Committee will maintain a harmonised 
VAT treatment throughout the member states. 
EU allowances (EUAs) as intangible assets need to be accounted for in the company accounts. 
Depending on price developments, EUAs may constitute a major factor in a company’s profit 
and loss account (P&L). According to the financial reporting guidelines drafted by the 
International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) in December 2003, the 
valuation of these intangible assets can lead to mismatches in the accounts. The reason is that 
assets (allowances) are valued at cost in accordance with International Accounting Standard 
(IAS) 38, and the reported liability is measured at market value (IAS 37). As a result, the impact 
of emissions trading on profit and loss account and balance sheets is thus determined by 
reporting rules rather than by performance. The fact that advice from the European Financial 
Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) to the European Commission is pending increases 
uncertainty on how companies should report allowances. This uncertainty is further increased 
by the fact that accounting treatment of government grants, which could include EUAs, is 
currently under review by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).  
The work by IASB/IFRIC to address the mismatch issue should be welcome as it is important to 
complete work as soon as possible to give certainty. To the extent that accounts will be prepared 
under the existing (IFRIC 3) rules, there should be clear notes accompanying company accounts 
in order to help relevant parties (directors, shareholders etc) understand the way that emission 
allowances have been accounted for and that apparent effects on profit and loss figures may 
need to be treated with caution. At its February 2005 meeting, the IFRIC considered possible 
ways of amending IAS 38 to allow emissions allowances to be measured at fair value with gains 
and losses recognised in profit or loss. Such a solution on the part of IFRIC to amend IAS to 
ensure that allowances (assets) and emissions (liabilities) would both be valued at fair value 
(market price) and that changes in their value would be recognised as profit or loss would be 
welcome.  
Trade and traders under the EU ETS fall under the new Directive on market in financial 
instruments (MiFID), for which the framework Directive has been adopted.
9  Detailed 
implementation is currently underway through a number of implementation directives. In 
theory, this should lead to harmonisation across member states of the currently fragmented 
financial services market. Ideally, the MiFID via increased harmonisation will bring about a 
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more efficient market. The need for certainty and clarity for market participants is important, 
given that contracts that are entered into without the necessary financial regulation authorisation 
may be void and the participants subject to penalties. At the same time, it is important to ensure 
that financial and regulatory requirements are kept to a minimum. More strict regulatory 
requirements for participating emissions traders (e.g. capital reserve requirements) can become 
a severe barrier to market entry. Emissions trading has been imposed on the participants by EU 
legislation and should not be hindered by other EU directives. Therefore the MiFID Directive 
that is currently being drafted should take easy access to the EU ETS into account and not 
produce additional financial or regulatory burdens for participants in the EU ETS. Member 
states should deliver some level of harmonisation to enable smoother market operations. In the 
current situation, licenses are obligatory in some countries, whereas in other countries they 
cannot be applied for. These differences between member states regarding financial services 
regulation result in a fragmented market and should be addressed by the member states as well 
as by the European Commission. This process should lead to a clear distinction between 
transactions in emissions trading that are governed by financial services regulation, and those 
that are not. 
Support systems  
Registries lie at the core of the EU emissions trading scheme. National registries are a 
precondition for trading, except for forward transactions. Since the latter are expected to be 
settled in the last months of 2005, registries should enable transfers of EUAs and CERs 
(certified emissions reductions). A precondition for the actual use of CERs and ERUs in the EU 
ETS is that both the ITL (international transaction log) and CDM (clean development 
mechanism) registry are in operation. In order to make an impact in the first period, they should 
come into operation by 2006. While ITL and CDM registries are not issues for the EU alone, the 
EU could make their operation a priority within the international negotiations, e.g. ensuring the 
necessary financial resources for their development. In this context, the functioning of the CDM 
Executive Board will also impact the EU ETS. Furthermore, registries are a precondition for 
spot trading, which will help to make the market more mature and liquid. Spot trading increases 
liquidity as it makes the market more accessible by lowering the financial and delivery risk. 
Now that registries are being set up, there may be scope for continuous improvement. The 
European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET) has suggested a structured dialogue between 
Registry Managers to share experiences with a view to furthering their developing. A number of 
member states are jointly working to establish an electronic interface for the registries, which is 
expected to improve communication with the registries, especially for participants with multiple 
accounts and for trading platforms. The electronic interface will facilitate increased transactions 
as speed increases and errors are diminished compared with manual input. Existing systems for 
international gas and electricity trading could be used as a basis for such systems. Electronic 
interfaces can improve the communication with the registries, especially for participants with 
multiple accounts and for trading platforms. In the near future, very large numbers of 
transactions will have to be communicated to the registry at the same time (e.g. the delivery date 
of most 2005 forward transactions is December 1, 2005). This will only be feasible when 
trading companies can send their input data electronically to the registry. Manual input of these 
data could lead to a delivery delay and could also be a source of transaction errors. Sharing 
information and best practices among the registry managers of the member states will improve 
the quality of the registries. A structured consultation process among registry managers and 
market participants would be advisable, such as the initiative of a number of member states to 
seek more cooperation in further development of the registries. The early experiences with the 
German registry bring about the need to solve the liability issues resulting from failure of the 
registry. For example, the Defra-developed GRETA Registry software is currently licensed to 16 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA  
 
12 states. A collaborative alliance has been established between current licensees and Defra, 
which is underpinned by a memorandum of understanding. All parties share their experiences in 
relation to the registry, and this information is then used to enhance the registry’s functioning. 
The UK (Defra) and France (CDC) are working together to provide an international solution 
that will allow trading platforms and electronic accounting systems to communicate 
automatically with registries. 
2.2  Policy certainty and stability 
The EU ETS requires clarity in the structure of the emissions market and predictability and 
continuity in the event of major change. Clarity and transparency of NAPs for example concern 
the absence of ex-post adjustments, treatment of the new entrants’ reserves, the situation on 
inclusion of other gases or sectors and the mechanics of auctioning for those member states that 
want to use it. Of particular importance for the latter is the availability of reliable information on 
total numbers to be auctioned, timing and eligibility criteria for participation. Consistency and 
eventual harmonisation should generally be beneficial from a market efficiency point of view, 
although it is not a precondition for an emissions market. Functioning markets generally can 
accommodate differences by price differentiation. What is most important as long as NAPs 
differ is that they provide full transparency. For a start, such transparency can be achieved by an 
updated common format of NAPs with minimum requirements for the content (see section 3.1).  
The EU ETS cannot be contemplated in isolation from international developments. For 
example, the Bonn Agreement, later to become part of the Marrakech Accords, requires each 
industrialised country Party to maintain in its national registry a commitment period reserve 
(CPR) which “should not drop below 90% of the Party’s assigned amount…or 100 per cent of 
five times its most recently reviewed inventory, whichever is lowest”. This clause could cause a 
situation in which a national registry is blocked because a member state’s allowances reserves is 
less than 90% of its emissions. Such a situation could undermine the emissions market as a 
whole by excluding some countries and could raise issues of fairness, for example, by making a 
trading company that is in full compliance with EU ETS rules a ‘victim’ of a member state’s 
non-performance. One way to solve this potential problem could be to apply the CPR rules 
(attached to the Kyoto Protocol target) to the EU-15 bubble and not to individual member states. 
New member states, except perhaps Slovenia, are unlikely to be affected by CPR rules. 
An alternative is Art. 50(2) of the Commission Registries Regulation, which (paragraph 3.8) 
calls for member states to be warned by the Commission when a registry is approaching a 
breach of their CPR, but does not set out consequences of a breach. In such a case, the member 
state in question could buy AAUs to void the breach and to ensure that registries are not 
blocked. It is important that this issue should be discussed further by member states and the 
European Commission, with a view to clarifying and agreeing a position.  
Other areas that impact certainty and stability is allocation and notably rules on new entrants, 
closures, transfers, opt-ins and allocation methodologies (analysed later in sections 3.4-3.6). 
Rules on new entrants, transfers and closures should be clear and unambiguous, to enable 
market analysis. Rules should be set in a way that makes it feasible to execute and maintain 
them. There should be clarity in the NAPs about what happens to new entrant reserves that are 
not depleted, as unexpected cancellation or dumping of these reserves will distort the market. 
Lack of harmonisation allows for gaming and market inefficiencies as well as for increased 
complexity. In addition, there is the issue what to do with new entrants’ reserves if they are not 
used as this could create uncertainty and significantly affect prices. 
From a market perspective, expansion of the scheme (via new gases or sectors) is beneficial as it 
increases liquidity and supports the market (see section 3). This cannot happen, however, until PRIORITIES FOR EU ETS REVIEW | 17 
 
accurate monitoring and reporting (section 4) are put in place, administrative costs and 
complexity are brought down to reasonable levels and the abrupt changes and volatility in the 
allowances market are brought under control. The benefits of inclusion of other sectors have to 
outweigh the possible disadvantages, which might include less transparency, unreliability, high 
administrative costs or a sharp change of allowance market prices. For example, if a sector only 
includes small emitters, the environmental benefit may remain small but overall costs of the 
scheme will increase (see also section 3.6). 
3. NAP-related  harmonisation requirements  
A main feature of the EU ETS is its high degree of decentralisation, especially the way in which 
the scheme leaves the allocation process in the hands of member states. Consistency across 
member states is sought by the Comitology Committee, which consists of the European 
Commission and member states and which oversees implementation and provides non-binding 
guidance in the form of a European Commission ‘Guidance’ document
10 and on EU law such as 
EC competition law, notably state aid provisions. There has been a tension between the 
Commission’s priorities and the member states’ preferences to prevail in areas such as energy 
policy, accepting their use of the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms and considering the 
need to ensure the integrity of the scheme and avoid distortions to competition.
11 This tension 
was further exacerbated by the burden-sharing agreement, which has defined differentiated 
targets for the previous 15 EU member states.  
During implementation, especially NAPs phase I, a number of inconsistencies
12 across member 
states emerged that may undermine the effectiveness and the efficiency of the scheme or 
potentially distort competition in the internal market. This report examines the key issues that 
can be addressed in the short-term in the run-up to NAPs phase II and could eventually lead to 
an improvement of the EU ETS implementation process. Additional analysis on some of the 
fundamental issues raised in section 1.3 that can still be addressed in the context of the NAPs 
phase II will be provided in the follow-up CEPS report in September/October 2005. 
The analysis in this report attempts to achieve a ‘good balance’ between different objectives: i) 
environment (i.e. meeting targets from the KP and expected future targets); ii) efficiency (i.e. 
short- and long-term incentives and simplicity); iii) internal market integrity); and iv) 
                                                 
10 European Commission (2003), op. cit. 
11 This tension is found in Annex III of the Directive (reproduced in Appendix 1 of this report), which 
sets general criteria that should guide national allocation. During the negotiations of the EU ETS, there 
were attempts for example by the European Parliament to make Annex III more detailed, but they failed 
due to member states’ reluctance to cede ‘too much’ influence – as it was seen – to the European 
Commission on allocation, which in the end will be the key determinant of the carbon constraint for every 
company and by extension the economic burden for the covered sector. The EU could not even agree on a 
common methodology upon which member states should base national allocation, except that the main 
method of allocation should be free of charge. 
12 The CEPS Task Force Report on Business Consequences of the EU ETS (Egenhofer et al., 2005) 
singled out harmonisation as the top priority for the EU in the run-up to NAP Phase II. Particular 
emphasis was placed on new entrant and closures rules: “The absolute priority for the EU and its member 
states in the run-up to the next round of allocation plans must be to significantly improve the coherence of 
National Allocation Plans (NAPs) across the EU. These plans must also be consistent with the internal 
market’s economic objectives – notably including the treatment of new entrants and plant closures, which 
could potentially distort competition – but also environmental objectives stemming from the Burden-
Sharing Agreement or the Kyoto Protocol.”  18 | EGENHOFER & FUJIWARA  
 
competitiveness (within EU and between EU industries
13 and third countries). These are based 
on the following four  operational considerations, which in some cases may be mutually 
compatible while in other cases are contradictory and therefore constitute a trade-off to be 
addressed by policy-makers: transparency, feasibility (practical, political including 
competitiveness), providing a long-term perspective (i.e. developing the EU ETS to meet the 
long-term climate change challenge), and designing appropriate incentives (for both the short 
and long term).  
The following section suggest the importance of bearing in mind transaction costs when 
considering any further development/revision to the system. The EU ETS including its revision 
should ensure that the benefits justify the costs. This is important for all areas that will be 
discussed in this section (e.g. transparency of NAPs, lack of a common definition of combustion 
installation, allocation methodologies) but most relevant for new entrants, closure and transfer 
rules and the treatment of small installations, as well as for monitoring, reporting and 
verification, which will be treated in chapter 4.  
3.1  Transparency of NAPs 
Annex III of the Directive, guiding national allocation requires the involvement of the public. 
Non-discriminatory access to information and public consultation has been identified as a 
means to ensure transparency and accuracy of NAPs. Such transparency and accuracy is 
important both to avoid competitive distortions and ensuring that environmental objectives are 
met. It underlines also the need for transparency in the allocation methodology and the 
importance of the process being perceived to be fair, both in the level of action that is required 
from EU ETS installations as opposed to the rest of the economy and between and within 
different EU ETS industry sectors. To increase transparency, the European Commission has 
proposed a common format for NAPs
14 as well as six steps and when member states submit 
their plans (European Commission 2003a).  
Involvement of the public will in principle be guided by rules and practices of member states. 
The Guidance document on page 20 requires a “reasonable time frame” to be allowed for public 
consultation to allow EU ETS companies, environmental non-governmental organisations and 
other stakeholders to comment on proposed allocations. During NAPs’ phase I, the consultation 
period for many NAPs has been short, mainly for reasons of late delivery of some NAPs.  
Availability of data upon which the allocation has been based has been difficult to obtain. To 
assess and scrutinise NAPs however, as a minimum requires basic data such as on historic 
emissions and preferably also output or input numbers. For NAPs phase I it was difficult to 
obtain that data from most member states. 
NAPs phase I were complicated not only by data but also methodological uncertainties. Most 
member states had to rely on existing projections or revisions to existing projections. There has 
been insufficient time available to undertake a major modelling exercise, let alone in a co-
ordinated way. Hence, the different methodological approaches were varying. The application 
of different methodological approaches may make the base for comparison uneven. There was 
also uncertainty on whether certain methodologies could be accepted. In the light of 
experiences, further guidance by the European Commission on methodologies to calculate total 
quantities of allowances could increase certainty and comparability.  
                                                 
13  The perspective will be EU-wide without specific member state references or even firm-specific 
analysis.  
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Many member states have justified deviations by projected purchase of CDM/JI credits. As 
there is a major uncertainty on the scale of such credits available, many of the existing 
projections risk turning out to be overly optimistic. The European Commission could provide 
further guidance on the use of JI and CDM, especially on what evidence member states have to 
provide to justify projected quantities of CDM/JI credits.  
Transparency and the possibility to scrutiny could be greatly helped if member states and the 
European Commission could agree on an updated common format of NAPs, containing at least 
an Executive Summary including key figures such as on assumptions of economic and sector-
specific economic growth, explanation of methodologies to establish the total number of 
allowances, Kyoto Protocol targets and the trajectory to get there, details upon which member 
states base their estimates to purchase proposed CDM/JI credits including the expected share 
stemming from the linking Directive and publication of data upon which allocation is based 
including historic emissions and output or input data. The Commission’s new Guidance 
document could improve on the standard format of NAPs. 
3.2 Definition  of  combustion installations 
There are differences in the way by which member states interpret the definition of installations. 
The narrow interpretation would cover energy production sector and would exclude power units 
above 20MW associated with process energy. While some member states initially had planned 
to apply this definition, they extended the scope of definition more recently so that the narrow 
definition is not used any more. But there are still major discrepancies between the medium 
definition, which covers production of electricity, heat or steam for the purpose of energy 
production
15 and the broad interpretation, which includes the production of electricity, heat or 
steam in general.  
As an illustration, a company that operates cracker installations or joint ventures in different 
member states (e.g. the Netherlands, UK, France and Germany) can face a situation in which the 
installation in the Netherlands falls under the EU ETS, although benefiting in reality from the 
opt-out clause in the first phase, while its installation in both the UK and France do not fall 
under the ETS. And in Germany, it would depend on the type of permit the installation has been 
granted.  
Inconsistency across borders can lead to market distortions as well as allowing for gaming of 
industries when planning new investment. In addition, it may also have negative environmental 
consequences as large installations with high emissions remain outside the coverage. Hence, 
there is an interest in agreeing to a common definition. Ideally, member states could agree on 
harmonisation on a voluntary basis for example on the basis of a political statement by 
ministers. This might however be difficult and could possibly take a long time as member states 
more or less evenly apply both definitions. Another possibility is further clarification of Annex I 
by the European Commission by for example an explanatory note although this will be non-
binding. As a measure of last resort is that the European Commission starts infringement 
procedures on the basis that some member states apply a definition that is not in line with the 
Directive. The member states having chosen another definition than the one finally chosen will 
have to move to that one. Such a process could take several years. On the other hand, the broad 
definition will most likely include small installations, which has its own problems as will be 
showed in the next section.  
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3.3 Treatment  of  small installations  
Related to the definition of combustion installation is the treatment of small installations, 
especially the issue on whether to exclude them from coverage of the scheme. A broad 
definition generally can lead to the inclusion of many small installations. The inclusion of small 
installations can lead to high administrative costs for both governments and the covered sources, 
compared to the environmental benefit. However, a distinction must be made between initial, 
i.e. one-off costs related to the start of the scheme and recurring costs related to the operation. 
According to Actal, the Dutch Advisory Board on Administrative Burdens (2004), costs 
associated with small installations amount to € 9,000 per installation, excluding costs for 
verification.
16 Typically small installations emit less than 25,000 tonnes of CO2, which amounts 
to an additional cost of more than € 2.5 per tonne of CO2. Figures for the UK have proven to be 
even higher, especially for installations emitting less than 5.000 tCO2 p.a.. While during NAPs 
phase I via the use of the opt-out clause, governments had a tool at their disposal, such opt-outs 
are not possible for NAP phase II.  
Given the sometimes high costs associated with small installations, there is an economic case to 
be made to exclude small installations on the basis of a cost and benefit comparison with 
jeopardising the environmental objective. This is even truer as long as it is ensured that such 
installations would be subjected to an equivalent action which incurs less transaction costs. The 
case is further strengthened by the European Union’s drive for “better regulation” as part of the 
Lisbon agenda and the White Paper process on governance.  
Provided that there is an agreement that the issue needs to be solved, theoretically, there are 
different ways of tackling it. An initial and first simple solution would be to attempt lowering 
costs for monitoring and to review whether member states could reduce costs associated with 
small installation. However, in many cases the real problem for small installations is the lack of 
management time. Hence, should lowering costs for monitoring and reporting not be possible or 
sufficient, an additional or alternative measure could be to introduce a de minimis rule for small 
installations. With this solution, there is however, the risk for gaming and this might still require 
monitoring, hence additional costs and management time. According to Ecofys (2005), the best 
option would be to lower the CO2 threshold. For example, excluding installations with 
emissions lower than 10,000 tonnes CO2/year would mean to reduce the number of participants 
in the EU by 32% (or about 3400 participants), but decrease emissions coverage in the ETS by 
only 1%. Excluding installations under 25,000 tonnes CO2/year would reduce the total number 
of participants dramatically (-55%), while reducing the included emissions by only 2.4%. 
Finally, setting the threshold at 50,000tCO2/year would reduce the number of participants by 
70% but still only reduce included emissions by 5%. Monitoring would still be required. On the 
contrary, shifting the capacity threshold would have little or no effect on the number of included 
plants in most member states, because capacities of installations typically far exceed the 
threshold level. Ecofys (2005) concludes that only the ceramics and (specialty) glass sectors and 
combustion installations are affected by a shift in threshold level. However, an emissions 
threshold increases uncertainty and requires monitoring and reporting as well and hence costs 
will occur. A capacity threshold creates more certainty on who is in or not. A third possibility 
could however be a combination of both possibilities to optimise advantages and minimise 
disadvantages of both approaches. A fourth option is to extend the opt-out rule into NAPs phase 
II, which however would necessitate changes of the Directive. Such a change would require co-
decision, which unless NAPs are postponed is practically excluded.
17  As some operators 
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depreciation period for investment in monitoring and reporting. 
17 There is a possibility to speed up the decision making through a so-called fast-track procedure that has 
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currently under the EU ETS have invested in monitoring, opt-out appears to be the better 
solution to a mandatory de minimis rule. A fifth and final option is to expand the scheme 
beyond those installations covered by the medium definition where appropriate (e.g. to address 
significant competitiveness concerns or to capture large emissions without adding to the 
regulatory burden.  
3.4  New entrants, closure and transfer rules  
As the Guidance document states (p. 12), “the treatment of new entrants, i.e. installations 
starting operation in the course of a trading period, is one of the most important design choices 
in any emissions trading scheme”. The reason is that as part of the allocation process, they 
impact on firm behaviour’s compliance strategies. The Directive leaves it to the member states 
on how to allocate to new entrants. Theoretically, member states could allocate for free as most 
have done or force new entrants to buy allowances.  
Theory suggests that new installations should be forced to buy allowances. The reason is that 
the economic incentives to develop new and more carbon-efficient technologies are the same 
regardless of whether a new installation is given allowances for free or not. It is also argued that 
new installations do not carry the cost of previous investment, which was made when there was 
no carbon constraint (i.e. sunk costs), although this is only true as long as a new entrant is not an 
upgrade of an existing installation. 
The main argument for allocating to new entrants for free is that this might pose a market 
barrier as the new entrants have costs that established operators do not have. Hence, arguments 
in favour of free allocation to new entrants run along the following lines: 
1.  Perceived fairness; if existing installations get free allowances, why should new 
installations not also get them, especially as they carry a price risk? If new entrants are not 
granted allowances on the same basis as existing market participants, price risk, particularly 
in an illiquid market is significant. This is heightened by the fact that a new entrants 
entering the market would be looking to buying its allowances from its incumbent 
competitor. 
2.  Since firms typically are constrained by capital, and capital markets are not perfect, there 
could be reason to subsidise capital by allocating free allowances in order to reduce the 
investment barrier. 
3.  Existing installations are overcompensated through grandfathering, which may justify 
subsidy of new installations. Without free allocation to new entrants, new investment in 
new plants is unlikely to occur.    
4.  Existing installations are encouraged to continue operating since allowances are withdrawn 
if the close. This also puts new installations at a disadvantage. Thus the justification for free 
allowances to new entrants becomes easier under current closure rules than if closures got to 
keep their allowances. 
5.  Equitable allocation will help to contribute limiting wholesale power price rises and help to 
minimise windfall profits to generators. 
Hindering new entrants will actually undermine the deployment of new and more efficient 
technology, a key objective of climate change policy. Within the EU, new entrants have 
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especially argued that market power concentration and partly inefficiently working power 
markets in many EU member states or regions put new entrants in an additional disadvantage. It 
would not only keep inefficient plants in operation, but would keep an upward pressure on 
power prices as it would keep high costs producers (as marginal generator) in the market. An 
additional complication is that it is very difficult to distinguish between new entrants and 
capacity expansion. If they are not treated the same way, the result could be gaming (see Ahman 
& Zetterberg, 2003).  
The setting up and management of new entrants’ reserves have increased complexity, thereby 
adding costs and reducing the efficiency. The governments must decide on how to allocate, for 
example on the basis of expected emissions (since new entrants will have no historic emissions 
base) or on the basis of a benchmark. Member states must also decide what to do if more new 
entrants appear once the set-aside fund has been used up and conversely, what use will be made 
of any allowances that are left in the reserve at the end of the period. The European Commission 
has argued that the simplest option administratively is to make new entrants buy as it has 
recommended in the Guidance Document (p. 13).  
That the first round of allocation has shown that special provisions for new entrants in all 
member states has been and is likely to remain a political priority. It is therefore realistic to 
propose that member states continue to allow (but not requiring) new entrant reserves. However, 
to avoid competitive distortions, there should be a standardised approach across member states 
(see Ahman et al., 2005).  
Closely linked to new entrants are rules on closures, i.e. what happens if an installation that has 
received allowances seizes to operate. On closure, theory suggests that allowances in case of 
closure should not be removed as this increases the incentive to close down inefficient 
installations earlier as would otherwise be the case. As these installations will be replaced by 
more efficient new entrants, emissions would go down (see also Ahman, 2005 and Ahman et al., 
2005). Conversely, withdrawing allocation upon closure equals introducing an inefficient 
subsidy of continued operation. This puts existing installations at an advantage compared to 
new entrants. Since the number of allowances that would be lost upon closures are greater for 
inefficient installations – assuming they have been allocated a greater number of allowances per 
unit of production than more efficient installations – this subsidy can in fact be very significant. 
Efficiency aside, some argue the opposite point. As allowances are given for free, they 
constitute a transfer from governments to firms. With closure, the justification for this transfer 
disappears. However, as allocation periods are short, in reality this impact does not extend 
beyond the three respective five-year allocation period. However, it has been criticised that 
member states attempt to extend this period by adding special transfer rules.  
In practice, only two member states, i.e. the Netherlands and Sweden ‘follow’ the theory and 
allow for keeping of allowances in case of closures. As this extends only to the end of the first 
period, the incentive effect is likely to be small, however. In some cases member states were in 
favour to keep power plants running for reasons of security of supply. As to new entrants, most 
member states have created a new entrance reserve to be allocated for free to new entrants. 
Among the perceived reasons was fairness to new entrants in comparison to incumbents but also 
the concern with the internal market to avoid a situation whereby conditions for investment in 
one member state are better than in another. The lack of common rules in fact can be interpreted 
as leading to a ‘race to the bottom’ or a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy.  
Some member states (e.g. Germany, Italy, Austria and Poland) have introduced transfer rules, 
saying that in case of new investment operators should be allowed to “transfer” allowances to 
new installation. This has a similar incentive effect as to allow keeping allowances when 
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firms. As a result, they favour new installations of incumbent companies but not new entrants 
from new companies.  
From this analysis emerges that it would be beneficial as a minimum to harmonise rules on new 
entry and closure to avoid a race to the bottom, additional complexity and hence a less efficient 
scheme but also to avoid gaming. There is a close link between rules on closures and new 
entrants and the problems with updating/ex-post adjustments. In fact, adjusting allocation upon 
closure can be seen as ex-post adjustment and updating in disguise. The most striking example 
is maybe the German NAP, where adjusting allocation to installations going below 60% of 
projected emissions were considered ex-post adjustment and disallowed, but installations going 
below 10% are considered as closures and adjustment thus allowed.  
3.5 Allocation  methodologies   
The Directive specifies that the main method of allocation should be ‘free of charge’. The 
Directive does not mention ‘grandfathering’, which is allocation based on historic emissions. 
Indeed, Annex III of the Directive specifies a wide range of criteria for allocation, some of 
which require countries to take into account forward looking factors such as pathways to meet 
their Kyoto targets, future industry emissions trends, and industry’s ability to reduce CO2. Free 
allocation can thus be based on a wide range of factors, including benchmarking approaches.  
EU member states and the European Parliament, when adopting the Directive could not agree 
on a common methodology upon which member states should base national allocation, except 
that the main method of allocation should be free of charge (with some auctioning allowed). 
Despite guidance by the European Commission, allocation rules across member states are very 
different. Effects on differences have been documented. A study by Baltrel has found that the 
effects of differences of allocation rules for eight Baltic Sea member states cause differences in 
allocation of allowances in some cases in excess of a factor of four for the same installations 
depending on their location (Niininen, 2005). Similarly, mainly due to the stringency of the 
national Kyoto Protocol target, allocation to the Danish power sector has been considerably 
lower than to competitors, mainly in the Nordic and German markets (Hansen, 2005). 
In addition to the distributive impacts of allocation methodologies
18, there have been concerns 
that grandfathering does not provide incentives to abate. This does however not have to be the 
case. It is the price of CO2 that creates the incentives for abatement. Even if allocations are 
provided for free, they have an opportunity cost. Companies have a choice between abating and 
selling the allowance, hence they have an incentive to abate if the abatement measure is cheaper 
than the allowance price. Only if however grandfathering is based on some measure that the 
firm can affect such as output and emissions of the previous trading period, there will be little 
incentive to cut emissions. If allocation is based on output, the incentives lie on increasing 
production rather than reducing emissions. Firm have incentives to pollute in order to get more 
allowances. This is sometimes referred to as updating. However, as the previous section 
documented, some element of updating is inherent in the ETS. Rules on closures are a 
(necessary) form of updating. Similarly, the change of status of a new entrant to existing 
installation will also mean introducing updating. On the other hand, it is true that auctioning can 
provide stronger signals to the covered sector through the revenue-recycle effect. But it is also 
well-known that auctioning has the biggest economic impacts on the covered sectors and is 
considered as tax-like system by industry.  
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Within the legal limits of the Directive and political feasibility, member states had to strike a 
balance between environmental effectiveness, simplicity/efficiency and distributive impacts. 
Most member states tended to emphasise distributive impacts to the detriment of environmental 
effectiveness and simplicity and efficiency (see also Ahman & Zetterberg, 2003). Typically, 
however, this increases complexity. For example, the German NAP foresees 58 different 
possible combinations of allocation rules.  
 
Box 1. The triangle of effectiveness-simplicity and distributive effective 
 
Source: CEPS. 
Use of benchmarking  
Generally speaking ‘benchmarking’ is the process of determining what is best practice and how 
all other practices relate to that benchmark. It has therefore also been called performance-based 
as opposed to emissions-based allocation (Vanderborght, 2005). A benchmark system could be 
defined as fuel, technology and/or product-specific. The benchmark or performance standard 
would serve as guide to allocate allowances on some sort of “fair” criteria. As allocation is 
linked to performance, benchmarking rewards CO2-efficiency including investment and early 
action. Hence, benchmarking is principally meant as a means to address fairness and investment 
as it rewards performance. However, it does not always fully take into account sunk costs – as 
for example grandfathering does – that arise due to investment that has been made prior to the 
carbon constraint.  
There is no inherently stronger incentive effect of benchmarking than it is for grandfathering or 
auctioning – see above – except if governments resort to updating. Nevertheless, benchmarking 
has a number of additional advantages. As benchmarks reward CO2-efficiency and investment 
and are seen as such, they may enhance public support for the scheme and may be considered as 
more fair. In addition, once the benchmarks are established, there may be less lobbying during 
the allocation process although it can be assumed that the lobbying would be even fiercer during 
the establishment of the benchmarks, as it is not the allocation but the formulation of the 
benchmark that would decide upon losers and winners. Most importantly using technology- and 
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fuel neutral benchmarks for allocation to both existing and new installations would reduce the 
perverse incentives introduced by adjustments of allocation to closures and new entrants. 
Nevertheless, while benchmarking might be appropriate to set efficiency criteria concerning the 
allocation of emissions rights, the question of fixing the activity level for each installation is an 
open and difficult one. 
In addition, benchmarking requires to process a lot of data, hence may cause an administrative 
burden.
19 The Swedish benchmarking experience shows difficulties with data availability and 
other complication, such as setting boundaries of output or how to measure it. In some sectors 
such as steel, it appears to be very difficult to set a benchmark for an integrated mill due to the 
complexity of the production processes but also different legal operators. The alternative, a 
theoretical benchmark would be more practical but would have the disadvantage not fully 
reflecting the situation in each individual installation. Although over time, in line with the 
Sevilla process on BAT, it should be thinkable to move towards benchmarks.  
There have been many member states that used benchmarks in their phase I NAPs. Some 
member states (e.g. Germany, Denmark and Finland) have used benchmarks for allocation to 
new entrants, and some (e.g. Sweden, Netherlands, Italy) used benchmarks for some 
installations and /or fixed energy efficiency rates for energy production installations. While such 
approaches are covered by the Directive, the problem is that the metrics differ between member 
states. For instance, some member states base allocation on installed capacity and projected 
utilisation rates, some on projected output and others still on BAT. Hence, a fist step towards 
progress on benchmarks would be coordination across member states to avoid inconsistencies.  
There are some potential additional merits of benchmarks that could be further examined. For 
example, they could be used by member states as an instrument to compare different allocations 
in member states. More important possibly, benchmarks could become an instrument to 
establish long-term energy efficiency targets upon which to base a long-term cap for the 
manufacturing industry. The absence of a long-term cap as a result of the short allocation 
periods is generally seen within industry as a deterrent for new investment. In the long term, the 
EU ETS must, however, encourage investment in lower-carbon generation technologies, if the 
climate change challenge is to be met. Analyses of IEA (2003, 2004), Mc Kinsey (2003) and 
CEPS (Egenhofer, Fujiwara & Gialoglou 2005 for a review) have shown, it is highly likely that 
in this initial stage the EU ETS will add to investment uncertainty in the covered sectors with 
new investment being deferred. This and the design of a benchmarking-based system (e.g. fuel, 
technology and or/product specific) will also be discussed in the follow-up CEPS report to be 
published in September/October 2005. 
Auctioning 
Auctioning is allowed in the EU ETS, to a limited extent. 5% of the total quantity allocated in 
each country may be auctioned for the first phase of the scheme, and 10% for the second phase. 
While only Denmark, Hungary, Lithuania and Ireland have or will use auctioning in NAPs 
phase I, several member states have indicated to make more extensive use of auctioning in NAP 
phase II.
20 It is therefore highly likely that allocation methodologies including benchmarking 
and auctioning will become a central issue of 2006 review. As this report concentrates on short-
term review issues, i.e. NAP phase II, the analysis presented here will focus on issues that are 
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relevant in this context. A more in-depth analysis on allocation methodologies will be presented 
in the follow-up CEPS report in September/October of this year.  
The main issues related to auctioning is likely to be the impact on costs and resulting effects on 
competitiveness (i.e. profits, market share) for the energy-intensive industries, whose 
competitors are not subject to a similar carbon constraint, a “secondary allocation” debate on 
how to recycle revenues as well as open questions on the mechanics of auctioning for those 
member states that want to use it. In order to avoid competitive distortions, fragmentation of the 
internal market or price shocks to the market, it is important that auctioning is undertaken in a 
co-ordinated way by the member states concerned. Of particular importance is transparency and 
particularly information on total numbers to be auctioned, timing, eligibility criteria for 
participation such as credit worthiness and the rules for revenue recycling. Member states 
should also be aware that auctioning may spark price spikes. The European Commission has 
indicated to provide guidance on these issues.  
3.6  Expansion through unilateral “opt-ins”  
The EU ETS explicitly allows for more GHGs to be included in the EU ETS. This will be part 
of the formal 2006 Review. At the same time, under Art. 24 of the EU ETS Directive, there is a 
possibility for member states to unilaterally include additional GHGs, subject to European 
Commission approval based on both economic and environmental objectives such as potential 
effects on the internal market, distortions to competition, environmental integrity and reliability 
of the planned monitoring and reporting system. The rationale for including non-CO2 GHGs is 
both environmental and economic (see Box 2). Inclusion of new gases can offer major 
environmental and economic benefits such as covering more sources or potentially lower 
compliance costs if marginal costs in the trading sector are higher than in the installations to be 
opted-in.  
Box 2. Efficiency gains of a multi-gas strategy  
Including additional gases increases the variety of reduction options, offers additional innovation 
potentials if innovation lead times are respected and increases liquidity and ultimately the efficiency of 
the market. Precondition are however effective monitoring and that inclusion achieves real reductions, 
for example beyond business-as-usual. According to Capros et al. (2000), a ‘6-gas strategy’ approach 
for the EU ETS could decrease the allowance price by more than a third from the current price level. 
According to this estimate, the EU ETS allowance price for one tonne of CO2 equivalent could be 
reduced from €33/tCO2 with CO2 only to €20/tCO2 with six gases only to reach the EU’s Kyoto target, 
i.e. 8% reduction in GHG emissions. Although estimates about efficiency gains remain controversial 
for example depending on the translation of Global Warming Potentials (GWP) (e.g. Aaheim et al., 
2004), there is an acknowledgment that multi-gas trading is generally more efficient, i.e. it reduces 
compliance costs (e.g. Hyman et al., 2002; Kets, 2002). As Reilly et al. (2004) argue, as non-CO2 
GHG emission reductions do not exhibit high cost differentials across regions as those in CO2 
emissions would, it might be even easier to develop global strategies for reductions in non-CO2 GHG 
emissions than those for CO2 emission reductions only.  
 
Among the reasons for limiting the ETS to CO2 emissions only have been the willingness to 
keep the EU ETS initially as simple as possible but also the belief that the other non-CO2 gases 
are difficult to monitor with comparable accuracy. This contrasts with the UK scheme and the 
initially proposed Norwegian scheme, both of which cover all six GHGs. The internal BP 
scheme covers CO2 and methane. France has introduced a N2O tax, assuming that this gas can 
be accurately measured. Thus, there seem to be no structural issues related to measuring and 
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in some member states. Moreover the Commission's and member states’ caution was driven by 
a lack of reliable information on the use of additional gases.  
While the issue of new gases will be dealt with in the formal 2006 review, there may be a case 
for unilateral opt-ins under Art. 24. Member states should examine the possibility of unilateral 
opt-ins, if there are clear economic and environmental benefits, including notably that 
monitoring and reporting are ensured. Another precondition is that opt-ins do not 
disproportionately increase the complexity of the scheme, i.e. that transaction costs outweigh 
the environmental and economic benefit. This could for example be achieved by the de minimis 
rule for installations. In order to avoid that different member states apply different de minimis 
rules, all member states that wish to opt-in should co-ordinate the definition of thresholds. 
Otherwise, there is a risk of different rules applying across the EU, leading to distortions to 
competition or gaming. Another area for transaction costs have been the drawing up of 
monitoring guidelines. Industrial stakeholders have made the case that early industry-
involvement is beneficial to ensure that guidelines are practical and easy to implement.  
Further expansion of the system on a step by step basis is desirable to seek out the most cost-
effective abatement opportunities under the scheme. N2O emissions from nitric acid plants 
appear to offer a particular opportunity in this direction.  The European Fertilizer Manufacturing 
Industry (EFMA) has publicly announced to wish being included in the EU ETS. It claims that 
the EU ETS would double the cost-effective reduction potential by 2010 if compared by 
regulation under the IPPC Directive. As nitric acid plants account for about 10% of total EU 
GHG emissions from industrial processes (i.e. 40 million tons of CO2-e), such reduction 
potentials are relevant and may lend themselves to opt-ins.  
4.  Monitoring, reporting and verification 
Any emissions trading scheme depends on consistent and transparent monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) as well as efficient registries. Article 14 in the EU ETS Directive requires 
the European Commission to adopt Guidelines for monitoring and reporting of emissions, based 
on a set of principles such as accuracy, timeliness and integrity, set out in Annex IV of the 
Directive. The framework on monitoring and reporting is completed by verification (sometimes 
also called certification) and a registry. Verification ensures correctness and accuracy which is 
necessary for the trust in the market as even moderate margins of error impact the economic 
value and environmental integrity. The Directive requires verified data in accordance with a 
number of criteria set out in Annex V of the Directive, such as the quality and accuracy of the 
measuring equipment, effective data management systems, transparency of processes and public 
access to data. The registry is the tool to assess compliance within the trading scheme by 
comparing the emissions of the installation to the number of allowances the installations holds, 
i.e. tracking of allowances. 
Effective implementation of MRV rules is a precondition for the EU ETS to work
21, central to 
provide trust in the system as well as it offers major potentials to increase efficiency by bringing 
down transaction costs. That monitoring and reporting carry the risk of incurring high 
transaction costs as has notably been demonstrated for US trading schemes such as the SO2 
trading and the OTC NOx Budget Trading Programmes (e.g. Mangis, 1998; Holmstead, 2002; 
for an overview see Egenhofer and Fujiwara 2003). Arguably, for the US acid rain programme 
and the OTC NOx Budget Trading Programme, measuring and monitoring have been the most 
complex and costly element components of the trading scheme, although the situation is 
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somewhat different in the case of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which are in most cases not 
actually measured but calculated e.g. based on energy use or other proxies. The Monitoring and 
Reporting Guideline is, in some instances not practical leading to transaction costs that could be 
avoided. An example is the requirement to use ISO 17025 accredited laboratories which have 
limited availability. Another important cost factor is the obligation to monitor according to the 
highest tiers. 
Implementation  
Within the EU ETS, the major issue is effective and consistent implementation of MRV across 
member states. An example of inefficiency leading to increased transaction costs and high risk 
of inconsistency is the lack of uniform verification criteria and in particular the very divergent 
processes of accrediting verifiers. These processes differ not only between the 25 member states 
but in some member states they are either conducted or repeated on Regional levels such as in 
Belgium and Spain. This drives cost and reduces transparency for international companies 
wishing to apply uniform M&R procedures and one verifier throughout EU. Conversely, for 
international verifiers wishing to serve their international customers it can mean up to between 
40 and 50 accreditations to different schemes with increased cost and reduced availability of 
verifiers in the market. An example of divergence in application of the Directive and the MRV 
is the current proposal in France to apply less frequent verifications with larger margins of error 
as a clear consequence. This raises difficulties for the European Commission to ensure effective, 
consistent and reliable implementation. Such a plethora of different rules and procedures 
increases costs for ETS participants, which have to deal with a variety of different – often 
inconsistent – rules. Ultimately, both lack of effective implementation and differences in rules 
and procedures may undermine trust in the system from a financial and environmental point of 
view. The Commission’s idea to organise member states seminars to discuss how to harmonise 
monitoring and reporting requirements should be supported. 
In a long-term and global perspective establishing “common metrics” (i.e. benchmarks for 
monitoring and reporting) will be essential for a global emissions markets, should that become 
reality. Some global standards have been emerging as the GHG Protocol by the World 
Resources Institute and the WBCSD, the Global GHG Registry hosted by the World Economic 
Forum, and the soon-to-be completed ISO standards 14064. In order to minimise the risk of 
proliferation of national, regional and/or sectoral protocols, it is important that at least within 
the EU ETS, there is a common and unified MRV framework. 
Verification  
It is especially the case in verification, where efficiency gains are possible. Minimum 
competency requirements for the verifier as a criterion for verification (item 12, Annex V of the 
Directive) allow for a wide interpretation of what an adequate verification process is, how and 
by whom it should be accredited, and how it should be managed and controlled. Both rules for 
verification and accreditation are left to the discretion of member states to a large extent.  
In principle, the EU could establish a common accreditation body that is responsible for 
accreditation of verifiers on an EU-wide basis. This would have obvious advantages related to 
the environmental integrity and the uniformity of accreditation within the EU. This would have 
equal advantages internationally since this would be fully in line with UNFCCC for the CDM, 
thereby reducing the transaction costs of a company investing abroad. The feasibility of creating 
a common EU accreditation body as a real political option is unclear but remains unlikely unless 
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The more likely possibility is that different member states will continue to follow different 
procedures regarding both the process of verification and the accreditation of verifiers. On the 
one hand this might raise transaction costs due to different procedures that operators have to 
follow throughout different member states in the internal market. On the other hand, this allows 
for testing different approaches among member states and taking account of national 
circumstances, which can be beneficial, provided that ultimately a unified systems comes into 
operation.  
There is some harmonisation occurring through the application of the European Co-operation 
for Accreditation’s Guidance for Recognition of Verification Bodies under EU ETS Directive. 
Many member states are looking to use this document as the basis for setting up accreditation 
schemes for verification bodies, particularly those that are members of the EA. Verification 
checks should be as consistent as possible, but there may be some variations in roles and 
responsibilities that will exist because of local or historical legislation and experience. It is also 
important to keep in mind to reduce the burden for small installations. 
If harmonisation of rules at EU level both for certification as well as certifier-accreditation is 
not possible, as a minimum, accreditation bodies in all EU member states would follow similar 
rules for accreditation (to reduce transaction costs). Some member states are already allowing 
mutual recognition, but may still carry out some form of surveillance of verification bodies 
when they work in another member states for the first time (e.g. UKAS) Ultimately, such an 
approach could allow for "mutual recognition" of accredited bodies from one EU member state 
to another. The association of European Accreditation Bodies has attempted to create the basis 
for mutual recognition between some member states but this initiative has so far failed due to 
non essential additional requirements in most member states. Member states should support 
mutual recognition provided verification body is accredited according to the European Co-
operation for Accreditation Guidance on Accreditation and they perform the verification in line 
with relevant government’s guidance on verification. 
5. Concluding  remarks   
This report has essentially dealt with a number of important issues such as transparency of 
NAPs, definitions, small installations, allocation methodologies, opt-ins or monitoring, 
reporting and verification and to a lesser extent with market development. While addressing 
short-term implementation issues is necessary for effective implementation of the EU ETS – 
including its economic efficiency and viability – on their own they are not sufficient. The EU 
ETS has raised a number of more deep-seated issues including economic impacts, lack of 
certainty and its effects on investment and the possible extension to aviation. These issues are at 
the interface of NAP phase II and the long-term formal 2006 review. Hence, they will be 
analysed in a follow-up report to be completed in December or early 2006.  | 30 
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Appendix 1 
Criteria for National Allocation Plans in Annex III  
of the EU ETS Directive* 
1. The total quantity of allowances to be allocated for the relevant period shall be consistent 
with the Member State's obligation to limit its emissions pursuant to Decision 2002/358/EC and 
the Kyoto Protocol, taking into account, on the one hand, the proportion of overall emissions 
that these allowances represent in comparison with emissions from sources not covered by this 
Directive and, on the other hand, national energy policies, and should be consistent with the 
national climate change programme. The total quantity of allowances to be allocated shall not 
be more than is likely to be needed for the strict application of the criteria of this Annex. Prior 
to 2008, the quantity shall be consistent with a path towards achieving or over-achieving each 
Member State's target under Decision 2002/358/ EC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
2. The total quantity of allowances to be allocated shall be consistent with assessments of actual 
and projected progress towards fulfilling the Member States' contributions to the Community's 
commitments made pursuant to Decision 93/389/EEC. 
3. Quantities of allowances to be allocated shall be consistent with the potential, including the 
technological potential, of activities covered by this scheme to reduce emissions. Member States 
may base their distribution of allowances on average emissions of greenhouse gases by product 
in each activity and achievable progress in each activity. 
4. The plan shall be consistent with other Community legislative and policy instruments. 
Account should be taken of unavoidable increases in emissions resulting from new legislative 
requirements. 
5. The plan shall not discriminate between companies or sectors in such a way as to unduly 
favour certain undertakings or activities in accordance with the requirements of the Treaty, in 
particular Articles 87 and 88 thereof. 
6. The plan shall contain information on the manner in which new entrants will be able to begin 
participating in the Community scheme in the Member State concerned. 
7. The plan may accommodate early action and shall contain information on the manner in 
which early action is taken into account. Benchmarks derived from reference documents 
concerning the best available technologies may be employed by Member States in developing 
their National Allocation Plans, and these benchmarks can incorporate an element of 
accommodating early action. 
8. The plan shall contain information on the manner in which clean technology, including 
energy efficient technologies, are taken into account. 
9. The plan shall include provisions for comments to be expressed by the public, and contain 
information on the arrangements by which due account will be taken of these comments before 
a decision on the allocation of allowances is taken. 
10. The plan shall contain a list of the installations covered by this Directive with the quantities 
of allowances intended to be allocated to each. 
11. The plan may contain information on the manner in which the existence of competition from 
countries or entities outside the Union will be taken into account. 
                                                 
* Directive 2003/87/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, 25 October 2003), p. 43. | 34 
Appendix 2 
Criteria for Verification Referred to in Article 15 EU ETS Directive 
General Principles 
1.  Emissions from each activity listed in Annex I shall be subject to verification. 
2.  The verification process shall include consideration of the report pursuant to Article 14(3) 
and of monitoring during the preceding year. It shall address the reliability, credibility and 
accuracy of monitoring systems and the reported data and information relating to emissions, 
in particular: 
(a)  the reported activity data and related measurements and calculations; 
(b)  the choice and the employment of emission factors; 
(c)  the calculations leading to the determination of the overall emissions; and 
(d)  if measurement is used, the appropriateness of the choice and the employment of 
measuring methods. 
3.  Reported emissions may only be validated if reliable and credible data and information 
allow the emissions to be determined with a high degree of certainty. A high degree of 
certainty requires the operator to show that: 
(a)  the reported data is free of inconsistencies; 
(b)  the collection of the data has been carried out in accordance with the applicable 
scientific standards; and 
(c)  the relevant records of the installation are complete and consistent. 
4.  The verifier shall be given access to all sites and information in relation to the subject of the 
verification. 
5.  The verifier shall take into account whether the installation is registered under the 
Community eco-management and audit scheme (EMAS). 
Methodology 
Strategic analysis 
6.  The verification shall be based on a strategic analysis of all the activities carried out in the 
installation. This requires the verifier to have an overview of all the activities and their 
significance for emissions. 
Process analysis 
7.  The verification of the information submitted shall, where appropriate, be carried out on the 
site of the installation. The verifier shall use spot-checks to determine the reliability of the 
reported data and information. 
Risk analysis 
8.  The verifier shall submit all the sources of emissions in the installation to an evaluation with 
regard to the reliability of the data of each source contributing to the overall emissions of 
the installation. PRIORITIES FOR EU ETS REVIEW | 35 
 
9.  On the basis of this analysis the verifier shall explicitly identify those sources with a high 
risk of error and other aspects of the monitoring and reporting procedure which are likely to 
contribute to errors in the determination of the overall emissions. This especially involves 
the choice of the emission factors and the calculations necessary to determine the level of 
the emissions from individual sources. Particular attention shall be given to those sources 
with a high risk of error and the abovementioned aspects of the monitoring procedure. 
10. The verifier shall take into consideration any effective risk control methods applied by the 
operator with a view to minimising the degree of uncertainty. 
Report 
11. The verifier shall prepare a report on the validation process stating whether the report 
pursuant to Article 14(3) is satisfactory. This report shall specify all issues relevant to the 
work carried out. A statement that the report pursuant to Article 14(3) is satisfactory may be 
made if, in the opinion of the verifier, the total emissions are not materially misstated. 
Minimum competency requirements for the verifier 
12. The verifier shall be independent of the operator, carry out his activities in a sound and 
objective professional manner, and understand: 
(a)  the provisions of this Directive, as well as relevant standards and guidance adopted by 
the Commission pursuant to Article 14(1); 
(b)  the legislative, regulatory, and administrative requirements relevant to the activities 
being verified; and 
(c)  the generation of all information related to each source of emissions in the installation, 
in particular, relating to the collection, measurement, calculation and reporting of data. 
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